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EDUCATING LAWYERS FOR COMMUNITY
ANTHONY V. ALFIERI*
This Essay is part of an ongoing classroom study and clinical service
project addressing the mindful education of law students and the civic
training of lawyers. Its purpose is to build a pedagogy of community and
public citizenship within an outcome-based, rotation curricular model of
legal education sketched out by commonly allied scholars in prior work
here in the Wisconsin Law Review and elsewhere. The Essay seeks to
advance this earlier curricular work by integrating ethics, education and
psychology, and law and religion into a cohesive pedagogical approach to
civic professionalism and community engagement. From the springboard of
integration next follows a discussion of how normatively compatible a
pedagogy of public citizenship and community is with traditional notions of
the lawyering process and the adversary system. Additionally, the Essay
explores the functional compatibility of public citizenship and community
values with the current model of legal education. The issue of functional
compatibility gains particular importance in light of recent and widening
calls for institutional reform in legal education. The hope is to transform
conventional notions of lawyer role and function in the adversary system
and then, with those transformed notions in mind, restructure the curricular
form and content of contemporary legal education to better serve
communities in need through mindfulness and spirituality.
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INTRODUCTION

The word "attomey" means "someone who goes to town for
you"-which in context means "someone who goes to law
with you, " because the town where lawyers work is where
the law is and, although your attorney goes to town for
you, you can't send him alone. You have to go together.
-Thomas L. Shaffer'
This Essay addresses the education of lawyers for community. For
twenty-five years I have taught within an academic and practice
community of lawyers, clients, judges, scholars, and more recently
church ministers and their congregations in the impoverished, inner-city
neighborhoods of Miami. Throughout these years, the form and
substance of community have changed. For most, the form of a
community is discernible despite variation in the demographic status
and identity of its membership, or the geography and physical space of
its assembly. For others, the substance of a community is elusive, its
experience of belonging complex, and its intrinsic meaning
multifaceted.
To many lawyers and legal scholars, the substantive meaning of an
engaged community, a community where you have to go together,
derives in part from individual and collective efforts to fulfill a core
normative responsibility of the legal profession, namely to stand as "a
public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice." 2
Under American Bar Association (ABA) and state ethics rules, that
special civic responsibility should guide lawyer performance of the
professional functions of representation in advocacy, counseling, and
negotiation.' The purpose of this Essay is to explore the teaching or

1.

THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR

THE INNOCENT 217 (1981).
2.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE

1(2008).
3.
The preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct adds: "As a
public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system,
the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal
profession." Id. 1 6.
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pedagogy of community and public citizenship in legal education and
professional training.4
Part of an ongoing classroom study and clinical service project
encompassing the education of law students and the continuing training
of lawyers, the Essay seeks to integrate several fields of scholarship,
notably ethics, education and psychology, law and religion, and the
lawyering process. Bracketed by these overlapping fields, the Essay
proceeds in four parts. Part I constructs the pedagogy of community
and public citizenship from legal and theological materials on
mindfulness and spirituality. Part II locates the pedagogy of community
and public citizenship in an outcome-based, rotation curricular model of
legal education. Part III assesses the pedagogy of community and public
citizenship in terms of conventional notions of lawyer role and function
in the adversary system. Part IV evaluates the functional compatibility
of the pedagogy of community and public citizenship with the curricular
form and content of contemporary legal education.
Infusing the pedagogy of community and public citizenship with
the psychological and theological force of mindfulness and spirituality,
and integrating that pedagogy into the core substance of an outcomebased, rotation curricular model of legal education challenges
conventional notions of lawyer role and function in the adversary
system and, by extension, the curricular form and content of
contemporary legal education and professional training. These rising
4.
Elaboration of the pedagogy of community and public citizenship in legal
education and professional training sounds themes of civic professionalism heard in
both classical and reformist visions of the modern lawyer. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN
ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 4 (2007)
("That is the challenge of professional preparation for the law: linking the interests of
educators with the needs of practitioners and the members of the public the profession
is pledged to serve-in other words, participating in civic professionalism."); see also
Ann Duntuono, A Citizen Lawyer's Moral, Relgious and Professional Responsibility
for the Administration of Justice to the Poor, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1383 (1998); Ben
W. Heineman, Jr., Law and Leadership, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 596 (2006); Donald J.
Polden, EducatingLaw Students for LeadershipRoles and Responsibilities, 39 U. TOL.
L. REV. 353 (2008); Steven K. Berenson, Institutional Professionalism for Lawyers:
Realizing the Virtues of Civic Professionalism, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 67 (2006) (book
review). The same themes echo in the mission of an increasing number of ethics and
professionalism institutes housed at law schools, including the Stanford Center on the
Legal Profession at Stanford Law School and the Center for Ethics and Public Service
at the University of Miami School of Law. See UNIV. OF MIAMI SCH. OF LAW, CENTER
FOR ETHICS & PUBLIC SERVICE 2 (2012); Stanford Center on the Legal Profession:
Overview, STAN. L. SCH., http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/centers/clp/overview
(last visited Feb. 5, 2012) ("Building on the legacy of its predecessor, the Keck Center
on Legal Ethics and the Legal Profession, the Center focuses on issues of professional
responsibility and the structure of legal practice. Central concerns include how to
enhance access to justice, sustain ethical values, improve bar regulatory structures, and
effectively respond to the changing dynamics of legal workplaces.").

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

118

challenges call upon lawyers, clients, judges, and scholars to renew
their faith in the wider community of law in American culture and
society, and to regain a broader vision of public citizenship. This ethic
of renewal begins in teaching.

I. THE PEDAGOGY OF COMMUNITY AND PUBLIC CITIZENSHIP

The mission of a prophet is moral witness to (and usually
within) an institution.'
The pedagogy of community and public citizenship calls for a
more normative vision of law school curricular reform, a renewed
lawyer responsibility toward economic justice, and a greater promotion
of democratic community. The other-regarding, legal-political
enterprise of democracy promotion involves building and recovering
community in the contexts of underserved client populations segregated
by concentrated poverty and differences of class, ethnicity, and race.'
Both community building and community recovery demand creative
strategies of legal rights education, organization, and mobilization
common to liberal legalism and interest-group pluralism.' The
strategies seek to connect lawyers, clients, and communities through
practices of mindfulness and spirituality. Consider first the relationship
between mindfulness and community.
A. Miadfulness and Community
The interconnections among law, mindfulness, and community
development are often overlooked in the work of therapeutic
jurisprudence' and social psychology.' Yet, grounded in liberal
SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 177.
For recent discussion of legal-political advocacy on behalf of underserved,
6.
inner-city populations, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Post-Racialismin the Inner-City: Structure
and Cultur in Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 921 (2010); Anthony V. Alfieri, (Un)Coverig
Idendty in Civil Rigbts and Poverty Law, 121 HARV. L. REV. 805 (2008).
7.
The resonance of democratic community in claims of liberal legalism and
interest group pluralism derives from the work of the late John Hart Ely. See Anthony
V. Alfieri, Gideon in WhiteAGideon in Black: Race andIdendty in Lawyerigg, 114 YALE
L.J. 1459, 1481-88 (2005).
8.
See, e.g., Susan L. Brooks, Using Therapeutic Jurisprudenceto Build
Effective Relationshis with Students, Clients and Communities, 13 CLINICAL L. REV.
213 (2006); Keri K. Gould & Michael L. Perlin, "Johnny'sin the Basement/Mixing up
his Medicine": Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand Clhical Teaching, 24 SEATTLE U. L.
REv. 339 (2000); Bernard P. Perlmutter, George's Story: Voice and Transfonnation
through the Teaching and Practiceof TherapeuticJurisprudencein a Law School Child
5.
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experimentalism,"0 the growing literature of community development"
weaves disparate strands of grassroots organizing, 12 legal-political
integration," empowerment, 4 and mindfulness"s into a broad
framework of lawyering, policymaking, and lay advocacy. Within this
literature, the work of the East Bay Community Law Center (EBCLC),
founded in 1988 by U.C. Berkeley's Boalt Hall School of Law
students, stands out for its commitment to community engagement,
personal and professional role reconciliation, and mindfulness.16

Advocacy Clinic, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 561 (2005); Bruce Winick, Therapeutic
Jurisprudenceand the Role of Counsel in Litigation, 37 CAL. W. L. REv. 105 (2000);
Bruce J. Winick, Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Teaching Lawyering Skills:
Meeting the Challenge of the New ABA Standards, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 429
(2005).

See, e.g., Clark Freshman, Yes, and: Core Concerns, Internal
9.
Mindfulness, and External Mindfulness for Emotional Balance, Lie Detection, and
Successful Negotiation, 10 NEV. L.J. 365 (2010); Van M. Pounds, Promoting
Truthfulness in Negotiation: A Mindful Approach, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 181
(2004); Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions
of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients, 7 HARV.
NEGOT.

L. REV. 1 (2002); see also Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good

Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling
Clients, 23 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 437 (2008).
10.

On experimentalism in the liberal state, see Charles F. Sabel & William

H. Simon, Minimalism andExperimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J.
53 (2011); see also Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A ConstitutionofDemocratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Kathleen G. Noonan, Charles F.

Sabel & William H. Simon, Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State:
Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 523, 545 (2009); David
A. Super, Laboratoriesof Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failureof
AntioovertyLaw, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 541 (2008).
11.
See generally WILLIAM H. SIMON,

THE

COMMUNITY

ECONOMIC
(2001)
(examining community economic-development models and practices); Ann Southworth,
DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT:

LAW, BUSINESS,

AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY

Representing Agents of Community Economic Development: A Comment on Recent
Trends, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUs. L. 261, 270-71 (2004).
12.
See Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A CriticalRefection on Law
and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443 (2001); Supriya Routh, ExperientialLeaning

through Community Lawyering: A Proposal for Indian Legal Education, 24 PAC.
McGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 115 (2011).
13.
See Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating
the Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1999, 2004-05
(2007).
14.
See Daniel S. Shah, Lawyering for Empowerment: Community
Development and Social Change, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 217, 249-51 (1999).
15.
See Angela Harris, Margaretta Lin & Jeff Selbin, From "The Art of War"

to "Being Peace": Mindfulness and Community Lawyering in a Neoliberal Age, 95
CALIF. L. REv. 2073 (2007).

16.

Id. at 2075-77.
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For EBCLC lawyers and student advocates, mindfulness dictates
neither "a particular set of projects" nor "a particular model of
lawyering."" Rather, in the practice of both law and politics,
"mindfulness provides a framework for thinking about how individual
action is tied to group process," and moreover, "how group process
connects to institutionalized relations of power, and thus how
transformational change at the interpersonal level is linked to
transformational change at the regional, national and global levels.""
Mindful lawyering, EBCLC lawyers insist, "can connect the individual
practice of paying attention with the collective work of peacemaking."9
In doing so, mindful lawyering enables lawyers at EBCLC and other
law school clinics and advocacy organizations to "stand aside fromand abandon when necessary-the adversarial stance that so often
characterizes not only lawyering, but also organizing and even
progressive politics as a whole." 20 This elastic stance, mindfulness
proponents explain, "helps lawyers take on very different roles with
respect to the people they work alongside, depending on personal,
political, and cultural necessities." 2 1 Contingent on the circumstances of
clients and communities, the roles may tilt toward adversarial contest in
zero-sum situations or, alternatively, toward transformative change in
more democratic, participatory situations.
Contemporary studies of economic development and inner-city
poverty in Miami and elsewhere illustrate the central elements of
mindful lawyering that animate the pedagogy of community and public
citizenship. By definition, that pedagogy seeks to inculcate a
transformative vision of spiritual community.22 Assembled at Berkeley
from the teachings of engaged Buddhism, a mindfulness-guided
spiritual community should, according to EBCLC lawyers, "'take a
clear stand against oppression and injustice and should strive to change

Id. at 2076.
17.
Id.
18.
Id. at 2077.
19.
Id.
20.
Id
21.
See Anthony E. Cook, Beyond CriticalLegal Studies: The Reconstructive
22.
Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990); Anthony E.
Cook, King and the Beloved Community: A Conumunitarian Defense of Black
Reparations, 68 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 959 (2000); Anthony E. Cook, Toward a
Normative Framework of a Love-Based Community, in LAW AND RELIGION: A
CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 373, 373-82 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000); Martha Minow,
After Brown: What Would Martin Luther King Say?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 599
(2008).
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the situation without engaging in partisan conflicts."' 23 Applied to
situations of individual and structural injustice familiar to Miami and
other impoverished, race-segregated cities, engaged Buddhism
encourages lawyers to work collectively in relationships at three levels
or scales of practice: the first level involves the relationships of the
lawyer to the self and the lawyer to the client, the second implicates the
relationship between the lawyer and community stakeholders, and the
third entails the relationship between law and social justice
movements.24
Careful focus on the first-level relationships of the lawyer-to-self
and the lawyer-to-client, EBCLC lawyers contend, enables the
community lawyer "to see and identify her emotional reactions in the
moment, as well as to think through her situation intellectually and in
the abstract."25 Instead of heroic gestures,26 mindful lawyers "learn how
to listen to and communicate with their clients" across difference,
power, and privilege. 27 Listening across boundaries demands "attention
to the client's thoughts, feelings, and behavior" and an awareness of
how the lawyer herself may be perceived by other stakeholders not only
in interviewing and counseling, but also in negotiation and in coalition
building, where recognizing "the strengths, weaknesses, and
attachments of others" remains crucial.2 ' The practices of mindfulness,
EBCLC lawyers emphasize, "bring a level of sensitivity to emotional
needs" frequently expressed in the community-based processes of
stakeholder meditation and arbitration as well as neighborhood
restorative justice.29 The practices also provide a means of
"understanding how structural relations of privilege and oppression
affect group dynamics" in negotiated transactions and adversarial
23.
See Harris, Lin & Selbin, supra note 15, at 2125 (emphasis removed)
(quoting THICH NHAT HANH, INTERBEING: FOURTEEN GUIDELINES FOR ENGAGED
BUDDHISM 43 (Fred Eppsteiner ed., 3d ed. 1997)).
Id. at 2126.
24.
Id. ("Anger, sadness, disappointment, fear and anxiety-whether the
25.
source is the client or the lawyer herself-are common emotions for those who work
for social change, and they can lead to burnout, cynicism, constant rage, or despair.").
26.
Id. ("The mindful lawyer is also able to recognize that the desire to be the
hero often motivates social justice lawyering and is aware of the mischief that can
follow if this desire is at the center of one's lawyering practice."). For criticism of the
heroic lawyer tradition in civil rights and poverty law practice, see GERALD P. L6PEZ,
REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAw PRACTICE
(1992).
Harris, Lin & Selbin, supra note 15, at 2126-27 ("The mindful lawyer
27.
can learn to be aware of these matrices of power without being defeated by them, and
even can learn to employ them in transformative ways.").
Id. at 2127.
28.
Id.
29.
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proceedings, thereby allowing lawyers "to shift between different
models of representation.""o
Alertness to second-level relationships between the lawyer and
community stakeholders, EBCLC advocates note, highlights the risk of
overreliance on adversarial approaches to litigation and negotiation, and
the resulting tendency to "produce rigidity, blindness, and unmindfulness," dominant traits "that leave both lawyers and their
community partners disempowered and disengaged."' That risk is
exacerbated by emotionally charged personal and professional conflict.
By evaluating and managing adversarial risk, mindfulness mitigates the
divisive effects of conflict, and at the same time "serves as a practice of
attention to social relations of privilege and subordination."' Reference
to the structures of group privilege and subordination in communities,
EBCLC lawyers point out, encourages a more expansive legal-political
strategy that "goes beyond representing individual clients to articulating
community interests."3 3 This
longer-term and larger-scale
comprehensive strategy dictates multiple lawyer roles and services
ranging from technical assistance to collaborative partnership.34
Attentiveness to third-level relationships between law and social
justice movements, EBCLC activists add, "assists lawyers in
understanding the place of their work" in local, national, and
international struggles for democratic participation and economic
justice." Fundamental to that relationship are efforts "facilitating the
development and exercise of cooperative power."36 Mindfulness
embraces "cooperative power . . . built from below, beginning with the

interactions of persons and small-scale groups," assorted groups
"whose actions are shaped by clear-sightedness, cooperation, and
respect. "3 On this view, building from below helps lawyers, clients,

Id ("The mindful lawyer can recognize where the desire to 'win,' to be
30.
right, or to stand on principle, can lead both lawyer and client astray, and where what
looks like compromise can serve the greater good of the client and the community.").
31.
Id, at 2128.
32.
Id, ("Buddhism urges its followers to recognize suffering as part of the
human condition; to work to reduce needless suffering; and to bear witness to the
suffering that cannot be avoided.").
33.
Id at 2128-29.
34.
Id. at 2129 (urging that a lawyer "be transparent and explicit about the
role she will play from the beginning of a relationship").
35.
Id.; see also PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, GLOBALIZATION AND MARKETS:
RETHINKING IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY (Clare Dalton ed., 2007); Scott L. Cummings,
The Internationalizatonof PublicInterestLaw, 57 DuKE L.J. 891 (2008).
36.
Harris, Lin & Selbin, supra note 15, at 2130.
37.
Id.
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and communities "connect small-scale and large-scale transformation" 38
and "practice responsibility as citizens and consumers." 39
Facilitating the small- and large-scale transformation of
communities through cooperative, grassroots partnerships requires
"enabling strategies" for citizen advocacy.4 0 Such advocacy strategies
break from traditional routines in order to experiment with alternative
lawyer-client roles and relationships. Alternative practice roles and
relationships reorganize traditional divisions of advocacy labor and
reinvigorate historical narratives of citizenship. Vital to communitybased movements, these variable roles and relationships overturn
notions of lawyer moral nonaccountability, political neutrality, and
natural or necessary movement leadership. 4 '
Historical narratives of inner-city citizenship, particularly poor
black citizenship, accentuate elements of individual deviance, family
dysfunction, and neighborhood disorganization.42 These generalized
narratives depict a deep-seated, widespread state of dependency and
helplessness. 43 Citizenship narratives, in contrast, emphasize the
qualities of competence, independence, self-sufficiency, and
solidarity." Those qualities form the basis for a powerful "alternative

vision" of client community, even when conceding its economic
vulnerability. 45 To be sure, the narratives present only a partial
description of a fuller, more complex, and often contradictory social
reality. Yet, however contingent and indeterminate, they provide a

38.

Id. EBCLC lawyers remark:

Right action and right interaction with others are paths of mindful
lawyering: seeking neither victory nor defeat; getting caught up in neither
wild optimism that the revolution is just around the corner nor the despair
that all is hopeless; caring for others without attempting to make everything
about us; doing the day-to-day work of lessening needless suffering; and
witnessing the suffering that is an inherent part of being alive.
Id. at 2130-31.
Id. at 2131 ("Community lawyers must work in the here and now, but the
39.
ultimate direction of change must be toward economic analyses that value both greater
efficiency andequity; economic practices and institutions that foster trust and good faith
rather than greed and selfishness; and measures of well-being that take health and
happiness, not just wealth, seriously.").
Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, DisablingLawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
40.
769, 828 (1992).
41.
See id. at 836-37.
42.
Id. at 778-79, 794 n.114.
43.
Id. at 835.
44.
Id. at 828-32.
45.
Id. at 829-32.
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useful counterpoint from which to organize and mobilize legal-political
community campaigns for self-help and neighborhood improvement.4 6
The citizenship narratives of neighborhood self-help and
improvement help rediscover and recover the suppressed productive
capabilities of poor communities. Displayed in the work of church
ministries,
street-level nonprofit organizations,
and small
entrepreneurial businesses, the productive capabilities of communities
rework standard divisions of advocacy labor for lawyers and clients.
That labor includes interviewing, counseling, and negotiation as well as
fact investigation, policy research, and financial planning.47 Redefining
and reorganizing the labor of advocacy to affirm and strengthen
independent client and community capabilities denaturalizes the role of
lawyer leadership48 and personalizes the client's power to make legalpolitical judgments." Redivisions of labor extend to both task definition
and execution in the tactics of citizen advocacy, even when such
reorganization limits the role of the lawyer "to more confined, technical
functions where specialized knowledge is indispensable."" Tied to
private and public networks of social power, for example among
ministers, tenants, and homeowners, advocacy tactics oftentimes grow
increasingly collaborative." The interwoven relationships of the lawyer
to these three levels-to her own self and her clients, to community
stakeholders, and to social justice movements-create opportunities for
the cultivation of spirituality inside and outside the secular community
of law and politics.
B. Spiritualityand Community
Spirituality informs the pedagogy of community and public
citizenship.52 Tom Shaffer finds spirituality embodied in the practice of
46.
See id. at 832-35.
47.
Id. at 840-44.
48.
Id. at 839 ("Denaturalization tactics call for the lawyer to renounce her
professional claims of insight concerning client capabilities and, to a lesser extent,
juridical-legislative, administrative, and judicial-conduct.").
49.
Id. at 837-40 ("Personalization tactics ... return the power of making
judgments and predictions to the client.").
50.
Id. at 846 ("Functional lawyer confinement offers clients greater room to
exercise independence and competence.").
51.
See id. at 844-48.
52.
On spirituality in legal education and legal advocacy, see Deborah J.
Cantrell, What's Love Got to Do with It?: Contemporary Lessons on Lawyerly
Advocacy from the PreacherMartin Luther King, Jr., 22 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 296
(2010); Calvin G.C. Pang, Eyeing the Circle: Findinga Place for Spiritualityin a Law
School Clinic, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 241 (1999); Mary C. Scarlato & Lynne Marie
Kohm, IntegratingRelgion, Faith, andMorality in TraditionalLaw School Courses, 11
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reconciliation. In contrast to the adversary tradition of the lawyer as
the instrument or "champion" of a client and the accompanying
functional notion of "advocacy as a form of private warfare-a crusade
for rights," the practice of reconciliation offers an alternative vision of
54
moral community and legal discourse.
Shaffer concedes that reconciliation occupies an important place in
the adversary tradition. From the "top down" standpoint of that
tradition, he explains, the "courtroom battle" serves as the model for
advocacy both in avoiding and initiating litigation. 5 From the "bottom
up," by comparison, Shaffer's conception of a "peaceful life in groups"
supplies a competing model for advocacy, a model that operates outside
the courtroom as a form of reconciliation among individuals and
groups.5 6 This kind of conciliatory advocacy reconciles the advocate not
only "with those whose champion he proposes to be" but also "with his
hearers. " Put differently, it is a form of advocacy that "reconciles the
person whose cause is advocated with the persons who hear
advocacy."5 Further, "it reconciles people who are, seen from the top

down, at war with one another.""
To Shaffer, advocacy from the "bottom up," coupled with the
practice of reconciliation, "brings to communities a new sense of those
the community neglects." 0 Advocacy waged on behalf of the neglected,
Shaffer contends, "seeks to make things better" through "moral
discourse." 6' Typical of local or institutionally specific reform
campaigns, advocacy-as-reconciliation functions "as a form of moral
witness," pursued at times in the broad "name of justice" and at other

REGENT U. L. REV. 49 (1998); Lucia Ann Silecchia, Integrating SpiritualPerspectives
with the Law School Experience: An Essay and an Invitation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV.

167 (2000); Melanie D. Acevedo, Note, Client Choices, Community Values: Why
Faith-Based Legal Services Providers Are Good for Poverty Law, 70 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1491 (2002).
SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 111-12; see also THOMAS L. SHAFFER WITH
53.
MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 196-217 (1991) [hereinafter SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS]
(discussing the community of the faithful); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE
PROFESSIONS 28-38 (1987) (discussing lawyer character in community, moral theology,
and professional virtue).
SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 111-12 ("Advocacy is largely, in fact, the
54.

practice of reconciliation.").
Id.
55.
Id. at 111.
56.
Id. at 112.
57.
58.
Id. at 111-12.
Id.
59.
Id. at 112.
60.
Id.
61.
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times in the narrower interests of some segment of the community.6 2
Shaffer links reconciliation-directed advocacy to the values of
"goodness" and "interpersonal harmony," rather than to the general
interests of the public or to a single, universal cause.63
Shaffer's concept of goodness extends to both the privileged and
the subordinated, that is to both power brokers and powerless clients.
Goodness in this inclusive sense permits advocates to appeal "not to
power but to conscience," and in doing so "to reconcile people rather
than defeat them."' The appeal to conscience is fundamental to
Shaffer's analysis. He notes that appeals "to authority, to profit, and to
secondary values such as order," or simply to power, "are effective or
not without regard to the conscience of the decision maker." 65
Contrasting appeals to conscience, however, "are concerned with
primary values," for example, "the conversion of the decision makerwith his goodness," 6 6 a reconciliation of intrinsic value and the self.
For Shaffer, lawyer practitioners of reconciliation espouse a sense
of moral advocacy, a sensibility that gives rise to the instant pedagogy
of community and public citizenship. 7 Shaffer observes that such
advocacy, by its very nature, makes moral claims deduced from moral
principles.6 ' Although the claims and principles contain legal as well as
moral content, he maintains that "their force in law is consequential to
their moral force." 69 In this way, they carry "prophetic" significance.o
Advocates of moral claims, Shaffer remarks, "also seem to be
prophetic in that they do not mind being irritators."" The very decision
"to take the risk of irritation," he adds, is "characteristic of the
prophet."7 2
To the extent that the moral discourse of reconciliation "binds
together the hearer, the advocated, and the advocate," Shaffer argues,
it "tends more to the development of a compassionate community" in
terms of "'the things that make for peace and build up the common
life.""' This community orientation encourages advocates "to look
beyond the group, and even beyond the state" in addressing various
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 113.
Id.
Id.
See id.at 113-14.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 131 (quoting Romans 14:19).
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"decision makers and wielders of power." 74 Likewise directed toward
decision makers and power brokers, the adversary discourse of
traditional litigation and negotiation, for Shaffer, involves competing
"ideals of dignity, image, influence, and survival in the professional
group, the legal profession."" That professional focal point
"emphasizes uprightness, respectability, and moral independence in
individual practitioners," elevating client "loyalty" to the level of a
"governing ethical principle" and diminishing "faithfulness as a
virtue." 7 6 Differentiated by role and self-image, the moral advocate
"identifies" with the "goodness" and intrinsic "moral claims" of the
client.
Shaffer reasons that an advocacy stance of "moral discourse
reconciles advocate to client, advocate to those who listen to advocacy,
and those who hear advocacy to the client." 78 Discourse-driven
reconciliation emerges "by exalting care over professionalism, through
arguing to the consciences of those it addresses, and through arguing
from the persons of those whose cause is advocated." 79 The discourse
of reconciliation, Shaffer asserts, "also radiates into the community,"
in fact "into consideration of social justice" itself." This extension, he
continues, stems from the distinctive features of moral discourse."
From the outset, the moral discourse of reconciliation speaks to
"interpersonal" relationships. 82 Furthermore, the discourse of
reconciliation advances "from the person of the client"" and addresses
"the conscience of those who hear it."84 Finally, reconciliation
discourse "binds the community together" in moral terms.
For Shaffer, the starting point of an advocacy stance cast as
"moral discourse" is "the person of the client."86 Shaffer ties the
mission of advocacy to "the unique personality of the client." 87 In
effect, advocacy offers "that unique personality up as its strongest

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 127 ("It reconciles those otherwise seen to be at war.").
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 128.
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argument. "88 Led by this logic, a practitioner of reconciliation
"advocates a person more than a cause." 89 Shaffer distinguishes this
purposive starting point from the preliminary task of self-examination
for the moral advocate. As a threshold matter, he urges advocates "to
cultivate an examination of conscience," a form of self-scrutiny that
contemplates the codes and consensus of professional community yet
reserves the moral discretion to overstep the "bounds" of professional
regulation, even when such rule-breaking serves to "annoy" community
"governors."'
Concentration on "service to the person" in moral discourse
"radiates into the community," according to Shaffer, "because it is
interpersonal, because it argues from the person of the client, because it
is addressed to the conscience, and because it seeks reconciliation
rather than victory."" Service by means of "moral discourse" and
reconciliation, Shaffer cautions, neither acquiesces to power nor works
"to justify itself in terms of power."92 Fairly seen, his "ideals" of moral
discourse and service "share a tendency to reconciliation and disdain a
tendency to support for power, professional honor, and protected
membership in a protected group."9 3 Discourse on this view is "an
interpersonal thing-a thing grounded in the person of the client, a plea
to conscience, and a form of reconciliation" applicable to communities
as a whole. 94
To Shaffer, "the lawyer is an expert on communities, and an
expert particularly in his coming to understand the fact that the
community is sinful and tragic." 95 Both sin and tragedy arise out of
"what is inevitable about communities: They kick people out." 96
Communities in this sense "are exclusive and cruel. 97 Shaffer
envisions "a lawyer as the representative of those who bear the burden
of the community's sin and tragedy."98 Still, he acknowledges,

88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Id. at 127-28 ("When the community says we are overstepping our
bounds ... we are probably doing something right.").
91.
Id. at 132.
92.
Id.
93.
Id. at 133.
94.
Id.
95.
Id. at 217.
96.
Id. at 223 ("In this sense the Christian community, the church-and, by
metaphor, the benign communities we lawyers have and sustain-are contradictions.").
97.
Id. at 218 ("A benign community-'community of believers,' say, or
'Christian community'-is a contradiction; it is, in the most radical sense,
impossible.").
98.
Id. at 217.
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communities "are entitled to hope. "" Community-based hope comes
from "two or three" lawyers, clients, or ordinary citizens "acting
together" to form a makeshift church, whatever the size of the
congregation." The task for practitioners of reconciliation is to act "in
some collective way, to reach out and rescue the necessary, tragic
victims of community."'
Shaffer notes the contradiction confronting advocates in seeking to
build or recover moral community "and at the same time practice
rescue operations that undermine the community's ability to stand for
something."' 0 2 This contradiction posits the tragedy of impoverished
inner-city communities undergoing commercial and residential
When "it is not possible for a
gentrification and displacement.'
community to proclaim its values and at the same time to minister to
those whose rejection is the language the community uses to proclaim
the values," Shaffer observes, "then the community has come upon its
tragedy."" The "policies and structures, sound administration, correct
teaching, and ethical thoroughness" lawyers contribute to communities,
here in the form of economic development and urban preservation, he
laments, "won't relieve the tragedy of communities" or "solve the
tragedy of exclusion." 0 " Only hope, Shaffer mentions, embodied in
optimisms and truth, o0 can give meaning to the pain of tragedy
sufficient to oppose and sometimes to triumph over power and
privilege. os

From Shaffer's standpoint, the signs of hope in a community arise
from local acts of witness and legal-political defiance. To bear witness,
Shaffer explains, is to "remind[] the world of its relative
99.
Id. at 218.
100. Id. ("[T]he church is a metaphor for communities such as law firms, civil
communities controlled (as most of them are) by lawyers, and even voluntary
associations in which lawyers work, as they think, for the public good.").
101.
Id. at 223.
102. Id.
103.
Id. For a discussion of resistance to gentrification and displacement in
inner-city communities, see Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race,
Poverty, and Exclusion at the Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1095 (2008); john a.
powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them the Old "One-Two" Gentrificationand
the K.O. of Impoverished UrbanDwellers of Color, 46 How. L.J. 433 (2003).
104. SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 224.
105.
Id.
106. Id. ("[O]ptimism, in Christian communities of all kinds, is the promise of
Jesus that he is with every two or three of us.").
107. Id. ("[Tiruth is our understanding that the church, defined in this
whenever-two-or-three-gather way, and so even the church including groups of
lawyers, has to accept the fact that it is not possible to stand for something without
causing pain.").
108. Id.
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powerlessness,"" and to engage in defiance is to "stand against
worldly power."no Both witness and defiance constitute acts of belief.
In struggles over community economic development and preservation,
the "primary witness" a faithful "believer" in any church or
congregation may "give in the world of power is a witness of
limitation."1.' A believer will "stand against worldly power" as a
"witness" to its own "limitation."112 This stance carves out an
"operative theology for those who look at the law, and go into it, from
the community of the faithful," a legal-political "theology of hope and
of faithful witness."113 The next Part seeks to meld EBCLC's vision of
mindfulness in advocacy and Shaffer's theology of hope and faithful
witness with the larger pedagogy of community and public citizenship
into an outcome-based, rotation curricular model of legal education.
II. CURRICULAR EXPERIMENTATION
To combine mindfulness in advocacy, the theology of hope, and
the pedagogy of community and public citizenship into an outcomebased, rotation model of legal education requires the evaluation of
innovative prescriptions for institution-wide, curricular reform. In
recent work here in the Wisconsin Law Review, Drew Coursin
announces a prescriptive call for curricular reform in a contemporary
analysis of the legal services industry and legal education more
generally." 4 This call emanates in part from widespread reports of a
growing crisis inside the legal academy"' and the profession,"' and
outside in regulatory bodies at state' and national".. levels. The crisis
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 225.
Id.
Id.
Id.

113.

SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 53, at 217.

114.
See generally Drew Coursin, Comment, Acting Like Lawyers, 2010 Wis.
L. REv. 1461.
115.
See Michael A. Olivas, Ask Not for Whom the Law School Bell Tolls,
2011-3 AALS NEWS (Ass'n of Am. Law Schools, Wash., D.C.), Fall 2011, at 1; see
also Julie Margetta Morgan, What Can We Learn from Law School? Legal Education
Reflects Issues Found in All of Higher Education, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec.
2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/12/pdf/legal education.pdf.
116.
See Richard A. Matasar, Does the Current Model of Legal Education
Work for Law Schools, Law Firms (or Anyone Else)?, N.Y. ST. B. J., Oct. 2010, at
20; Richard A. Matasar, The Viability of the Law Degree: Cost, Value, and Intrinsic
Worth, 96 IOWA L. REv. 1579 (2011).
117.
See David Segal, The Price to Play Its Way, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011,
at BU 1.
118.
See David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,
2011, at BUl; David Segal, Law School Economics: Ka-Ching!, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
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embroils legal education" 9 and the legal services industry 120 in issues of
short-term sustainability and long-term viability.
Changes in the culture and economics of the legal services
industry, Coursin makes plain, have rendered a "monumental shift"'21
in the practice of law illustrated, for example, by the growth in lateral
lawyer migration,122 the emergence of multi-tier partnerships,1 23 the
increase in partner de-equitization and expulsion,124 and the
transformation of the structure of large law firms.' 25 Despite industry
efforts to "minimize" the effects of such changes,126 he points out that
marketplace trends have adversely impacted law students through the
dissolution of national law firms, the deferment of first-year associates,
2011, BUl; Eric Kelderman, American Bar Association Takes Heat from Advisory
2011)
9,
(June
EDUC.
HIGHER
Accreditation, CHRON.
Panel on
http://chronicle.com/article/American-Bar-Association-Takes/127869/
see
?key= SWglIgU5ZXVKZnlqZjOUYDOAbH ltNxh2YnhNPnotblxREw %3D %3D;
also Laurel S. Terry, From GATS to APEC- The Impact of Trade Agreements on
Legal Services, 43 AKRON L. REv. 875 (2010); Laurel S. Terry, The European
Commission Project Regarding Competition in Professional Services, 28 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 1 (2009); Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession:
The Impact of Treating the Legal Profession as "Service Providers", 2008 J. PROF.
LAW. 189.
See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (forthcoming 2012);
119.
David Barnhizer, Redesigning the American Law School, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REv. 249;
Michael A. Olivas, Paying for a Law Degree: Trends in Student Borrowing and the
Ability to Repay Debt, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 333 (1999); Press Release, NALP, Class of
2010 Graduates Faced Worst Job Market Since Mid-1990s: Longstanding Employment
at
available
2011),
1,
(June
Interrupted
Patterns
http://www.nalp.org/uploads/PressReleases/ 1lSelectedFindings.pdf; see also Philip G.
Schrag & Charles W. Pruett, CoordinatingLoan Repayment Assistance Programs with
New Federal Legislation, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 583 (2011); Philip G. Schrag, The
FederalIncome-Contingent Repayment Option for Law Student Loans, 29 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 733 (2001).

120. See John Markoff, Armies of Expensive Lawyers, Replaced by Cheaper
Software, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2011, at Al (reporting on technology-driven
restructuring of legal work); Catherine Rampell, At Well-Paying Law Firms, a LowPaid Corner, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2011, at Al (reporting on rise in domestic
outsourcing).
Coursin, supra note 114, at 1467.
121.
122. See generally William D. Henderson & Leonard Bierman, An Empirical
Analysis of LateralLawyer Trends from 2000 to 2007: The Emerging Equilibrium for
CorporateLaw Firms, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1395 (2009).
123. See William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier Versus
Two-TierPartnershosintheAm Law200, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1691, 1706 (2006).
124. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Big Law and Risk Management: Case Studies of
Litigation, Deals, and Diversity, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 991, 1011-12 (2011).
125. See Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament. A
Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1867, 1882-85 (2008).
126. Coursin, supra note 114, at 1468-69 ("[Law firms have their] hands full
managing their business and adjusting to difficult economic times.").
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the reduction in on-campus recruitment, the contraction of summer
associate programs, and the decline in law firm compensation. 2 In the
current economic environment, Coursin argues, "employers must focus
on serving clients, and cannot waste resources on remedial education
for new associates." 12 ' Law schools, he insists, "must adapt" to this
client-tailored focus, and law students in turn must learn "to make
themselves useful and competitive as new practitioners."1 29 Professional
adaptation-individual and institutional-hinges on the curricular
history of legal education.
A. The CurricularHistory of Legal Education
For Coursin, both law schools and law students confront barriers
to market adaptation,130 including the escalating cost of legal
education,"' the upsurge in outcome measures,132 and the globalization
of the legal profession.133 Surprisingly, the highest barriers may rise out
of the structure of legal education itself. Coursin describes the evolution
of modern legal education from the English apprenticeship model of the
eighteenth century to the university-based Langdellian case-dialogue
model of the late-nineteenth century and, more recently, to the postCarnegie Report experimentation of the late-twentieth century. 3' in the
127. Id. at 1468.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1467-68; see Katherine Mangan, Law Schools Are Urged to Focus
More on PracticalSkills and Less on Research, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 9, 2011),
http://chronicle.com/article/Law-Schools-Are-Urged-to-Focus/125902/;
Katherine
Mangan, Law Schools Revamp Their Curricula to Teach Practical Skills, CHRON.
HIGHER
EDUC.
(Feb.
27,
2011),
http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/news/thirdyearchronicle.pdf;
Karen Sloan, Reality's
Knocking: Down Economy Pushes Law Schools to Focus More on Practical Training,
NAT'L
L.J.
(Sept.
14,
2009),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id= 1202433723740&slreturn= 1&hbxl
ogin= 1; Rachel M. Zahorsky, Law School Rank and Class Year Take Back Seat to
Practical Skills in 2010, A.B.A.
J. (Jan. 7,
2010,
11:01 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law-schoolrankand-class_year take-back_s
eat to_practicalskillsin_2010.
130. Coursin, supra note 114, at 1468-69.
131.
See Andrew P. Morriss & William D. Henderson, The New Math of
Legal Education, YOUNG LAW., July 2008, at 1.
132.
See Andrew P. Morriss & William D. Henderson, Measuring Outcomes:
Post-GraduationMeasures of Success in the U.S. News & World Report Law School
Rankings, 83 IND. L.J. 791, 794-95 (2008).
133.
See William D. Henderson, The Globalizationof the Legal Profession, 14
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2007).
134. Coursin, supra note 114, at 1470-75. For a more detailed historical
survey, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Against Practice, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1073, 1076-78
(2009).
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Langdellian pedagogy still dominant within modem legal education, he
discerns a "mostly theoretical model" rooted in scientific realism and
doctrinal formalism, a model that discounts experiential learning and
the development of practical professional skills in classroom and
clinical environments. 135
Coursin seeks to cure this curricular omission and mitigate the
adverse impact of persistent turmoil in the legal services industry by
integrating more experiential skills training into the three-year regimen
of legal education.136 He traces the origins of this integrative effort to
the ABA's 1979 Cramton Reportl 3 7 and the 1992 MacCrate Report. 138
The Cramton Report emphasized the cultivation of critical thinking and
problem-solving skills.139 Likewise, the MacCrate Report stressed the
development of problem-solving abilities and the improvement of legal
research, 40 communication, and negotiation skills.141 More
comprehensive, the 2007 Carnegie Report urged the integration of
practical skills and professionalism training throughout the law school
curriculum, especially the encouragement of ethical judgment,
interpersonal communication, and civic commitment.14 2
Coursin traces post-Carnegie innovations in legal education across
the curriculum, for instance at the U.C. Irvine School of Law where
first-year students learn early lessons about the history of the legal
profession,143 and at Washington & Lee School of Law, where thirdyear students receive intensive, practical skill instruction through
clinical simulations and small-group practicums.'" Coursin views
traditional ABA accreditation standards as "roadblocks to change" in
the movement toward more experiential education, noting that current
135.
Coursin, supra note 114, at 1470. See generally STEPHEN M. FELDMAN,
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN
INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE (2000); BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: C. C. LANGDELL, 1826-1906 (2009); ROBERT STEVENS,
LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE

1850S TO THE 1980s (1983).

Coursin, supra note 114, at 1463 ("Law students spend too much time
136.
learning how to think like lawyers, and not enough time learning how to apply that
thinking.").

137. Id. at 1471.
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139. Id.
140. Id.
Id. at 1471-72.
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142. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 126-28; James R. Maxeiner, Educating
Lawyers Now and Then: Two Carnegie Critiques of the Common Law and the Case
Method, 35 INT L J. LEGAL INFO. 1, 3 (2007).
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144. Coursin, supra note 114, at 1472-73.
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ABA accreditation requirements fail to require mandatory clinical legal
education.145 At the same time, he acknowledges progress in the
measurement of "Learning Outcomes" and the incorporation of "skillsbased learning into existing curricula."1" In this respect, consider his
outcome-based, rotation model of curricular reform.
B. An Outcome-based, Rotation Model of Legal Education
Coursin's account of curricular reform offers an outcome-based,
rotation model of adaptable, practical-skills training in legal education.
His account posits both "the necessity and feasibility of reform,"
endorsing medical education as an alternative teaching framework and
experiential learning model.147 Coursin observes: "Medical education,
unlike legal education, incorporates extensive experiential learning
techniques into its teaching methods," adding that "students learn in
classroom and lab settings their first two years, then move into clinical
environments their third and fourth years." 48 He mentions in particular
the opportunities for students to "rotate through various specialties,
including pediatrics, obstetrics and gynecology, internal medicine, and
surgery," and to "participate in hands-on learning experiences, which
hone their practical skills and expose them to possible career
choices. "149

Expanding upon that framework, the legal rotation model teaches
students not only how to "think like lawyers" but also how to "act like
lawyers.""'o Broadly applicable, the model interlaces the assessment,

preparation, and training of first-, second-, and third-year law students.
Assessment includes ongoing feedback, skill-component grading, and
outcome measures of practical skill mastery. Preparation entails initial
and continuing semester-long and summer orientation. Training
encompasses the case-dialogue method, classroom and clinical
rotations, and advanced, residency-like apprenticeships. The initial
work of assessment, preparation, and training begins in the curricular
infrastructure of the first year of law school.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 1474.
Id. at 1475-76.
Id. at 1461.
Id. at 1466 (footnotes omitted).
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1462-63 (footnotes omitted).
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C CurricularInfrastructureand the First Year
Coursin comments that the curricular form and feasibility of a
legal rotation model rests on law school institutional adaptability to
infrastructure change in scheduling, assessment, and communication.151
Derivative of the now-standard medical school paradigm, the legal
rotation model combines traditional doctrinal instruction, classroombased skills training, and tripartite (faculty, student, and placement
supervisor) mentoring in accordance with block scheduling and
variable-length class modules. 5 ' Coursin gleans outcome-based
objectives from the practices of modem medical education as a means
of assessing student curricular progress.
In the field of medical education, he notes, "students learn
essential skills as early as the first two years of school." 5 When
students reach the third and fourth years, they "embark on a series of
specialized rotations designed to instill practical proficiency through
hands-on learning. "154 For Coursin, outcome-based reporting across the
curriculum "benefits medical education by reinforcing the importance
of hands-on learning."' 55 He points, for example, to the practical
benefits of student "rotations through residency" in building on the
classroom "fundamentals" of years one and two and in facilitating the
transition to practice in years three and four.156 Rotations, he remarks,
enable students to "observe and work alongside more experienced
physicians in various specialties," and moreover, to "receive feedback
from supervisors and take written and hands-on exams to gauge their
ability to demonstrate the skills they acquire during rotations. "117 Under
this common apprenticeship model of clinical rotations, grades rest "on
medical knowledge, communication skills and professionalism, and
ability to perform essential techniques."' Under this engrafted model,
first-year law students would acquire a basic knowledge of the
profession and essential practice skills, second-year students engage in
clinical and simulation-based rotations, and third-year students
or residency
rotations
advanced clinical
in
participate
apprenticeships.159

151.

Id. at 1470.

152.

Id. at 1479-85.

153.

Id. at 1476.

154.
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Id.
Id. at 1478.
Id. at 1478-79.
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Id. at 1479-80 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1480 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1478-80.
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To enhance student understanding of the practice of law in liveclient and simulated settings, Coursin urges the adoption of a threementor, tripartite system. Introduced during first-year orientation, the
three-mentor system assigns each incoming student a faculty member,
an upper-level student, and a practicing attorney.16 o Faculty mentors
advise on matters of "curriculum, the educational process, and
expectations for performance."16 1 Upper-level student mentors connect
first-year students "to like-minded peers and experienced law students
who can help minimize the difficulty of the transition to law school."1 62
Practitioner mentors supply "students with some sense of the legal
profession" at large. 16 1 Coursin speculates that "introducing mentors to
students early in law school may inspire those students to seek out
similar relationships after they graduate"" and thereby strengthen the
bonds of law firm ethical culture.
In addition to multilayered mentoring systems, Coursin
recommends the implementation of curricular block scheduling and
variable-length class modules. The flexibility of block scheduling and
class modules, he contends, "allows schools to teach courses in
appropriate time frames" and "mimics the real world experience of
overlapping tasks and staggered deadlines." 16 ' Elasticity in first-year
scheduling, he maintains, "prepares students for the pace and timetable
of the upper-class rotations," including winter-intercession periods. 166
Class modules, he continues, make the first year a "dynamic"
experience, effectively "changing the pace of law school and
reinforcing the importance of adaptation to diverse schedules." 16 ' To
further enrich the first-year and upper-level experiences, Coursin
mentions the availability of extracurricular learning opportunities and
new educational techniques outside the classroom via "workshops,
listening sessions, and presentations that expand on the goals,
techniques for success, and desired outcomes of the law school
process. "168
160. Id. at 1482.
161.
Id. at 1483.
162. Id. (footnote omitted).
163. Id. (footnote omitted).
164. Id. Coursin remarks: "Institutions implementing the legal rotations model
work closely with their local ABA Young Lawyers Division to set up the mentoring
relationships." Id. (footnote omitted).
165. Id. at 1484-85.
166. Id. at 1485.
167. Id. at 1484.
168. Id.
at
1485
(citing
Workshops,
U.
Wis.
L.
SCH.,
http://www.law.wisc.edu/academicenhancement/workshops.html (last visited Oct. 31,
2010)).
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Coursin puts forward an elaborate process of assessment to
evaluate student performance inside and outside the classroom. The
assessment process involves ongoing feedback and component grading
that together appraise "students' work on numerous skills-based
assignments" across a range of litigation and transactional exercises.'
Coursin comments that "professors hesitate to deviate from the singleexam system, in part because large class sizes prevent them from
grading more than one exam per student, and the general lack of
teaching assistants who are qualified to assess students' work.""o He
attributes such hesitation to the fact that "professors' career
advancement depends on their publication output, sometimes at the
expense of their teaching"; hence, he urges law schools adopting the
legal rotations model "to encourage deeper focus on instruction by
relaxing institutional publication requirements."...
That process of dialogue, he asserts, affords students "more
detailed feedback on [their] skills progression" and enables "students to
make necessary improvements and adapt to the rigors of law school." 172
Consistent with the upper-level sequence of skills-based assignments,
Coursin intersperses longitudinal feedback throughout every rotation
that gauges professional growth and acquisition of skills like empathy,
interpersonal communication, client counseling, and overall
professionalism."' Additional, simulation-specific skill sets include
legal writing, problem solving, and oral communication.1 74
Experiential, skill-related dialogue pervasively informs the
outcome-based, rotation model of learning. For Coursin, the nature of
in-house and simulation-oriented learning in legal rotations necessarily
varies in focus and scope depending on their reliance on "real client
interaction and clinical field experience. "" He envisions such legal
rotations continuing through summer programs designed to help first
year students "maintain their intellectual momentum . . . and prepare to

enter their rotations." 6 Summer programs may be "freestanding"
(internal to the law school) or "cooperative" (external to the law
school) in institutional affiliation and structure.' 7 7 He next turns to the

169.
unreliability
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 1486. Coursin notes that "[tihe failure of a single exam lies in its
and inability to gauge students' skills in practical situations." Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1494.
Id.
Id. at 1488.
Id. at 1487.
Id.
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process of curricular transition and the implementation of upper-level
rotations.
D. CurricularTransition and Upper-Level Rotations
Coursin highlights the importance of facilitating law student
transition from first-year summer programs to upper-level rotations. To
plan for this transition, he proposes "an intensive orientation" period
organized prior to the second year." Tailored to "hands-on"
preparation, the orientation combines group meetings, consultation with
administrators and faculty mentors, and student-to-student "check-in
sessions" to affirm learning goals and continuity of commitment. 7 9
Upper-level rotations channel students into clinical and simulationbased pathways. Both "incorporate practical skills training, legal
scholarship, and exposure to various career paths." 8 o Coursin fashions
his dual rotations to be variable in length, narrow in scope, and
intensive in skill content. 81 Moreover, he situates the rotations in a
"strong mentoring relationship between students and practitioners" that
expands out to link students and faculty to the local bar and bench,
including for-profit and nonprofit law firms, courts, and government
entities.182 Linkages of this sort, he reasons, draw social capital from
existing relationships with clinical placement supervisors to create a
"network" of partnerships."'
The partnership network Coursin imagines enables practicing
lawyers to serve as "instructors and chief points of contact for each
rotation."l8 The diversity of this placement network, according to
Coursin, also permits students to deliver "legal services to clients with
specific needs" and thus "acquire a more mature perspective on
empathy, professional responsibility, and the role of lawyers in
society."'

Although he concedes that alternate, simulation-based

rotations lack live-client interaction, Coursin comments that faculty in
178. Id. at 1488.
179. Id. at 1488. Coursin also recommends that "students in rotations also
attend two or three full-day in-services at the law school, which allow administrators
and students to discuss their experiences as they happen." Id. at 1489.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1490.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1491 ("A supervising attorney oversees each rotation, along with
various junior attorney instructors and a faculty advisor to act as a liaison between the
institution, students, and practitioners." (footnote omitted)).
185. Id. at 1491-92. Coursin concludes that "[tlhe legal rotations model
depends on unifying the interests of students, educators, administrators, and
practitioners alike." Id. at 1492.
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fact "play a more active role in course planning and instruction,"
effectively controlling the learning process "to hone students' skills in
standardized ways."'"
To his credit, Coursin enlarges his projected outcome-based, legal
rotation model to engage third-year law students during their "critical"
summer experience and final two-semester academic experience."'
Infused with "a practical mindset," the model offers third-year students
both residency and two-semester advanced rotations.' 88 Residency
rotations place students "directly with legal employers in firms and
other entities," where they serve as full-time "apprentice associates
under the supervision of local practicing attorneys" while retaining their
law school affiliation for purposes of orientation, in-service days, and
course credit.' Once hired,' supervising residency attorneys function
as "the primary assessors of student progress," providing constant
feedback and skill assessment.' 9'
By comparison, Coursin remarks, advanced rotations place
students in "law school or in clinical externship settings" where they
may pursue complex "practical skills mastery." 92 In this way, he
observes, students enjoy "a significant increase in their opportunities to
apply lawyering skills in real world situations. "'" Skill assessment in
advanced rotations involves "thorough, individualized feedback" on the
"strengths, weakness, and personal skills development" of individual
students. 194 Basic to such character and skills development, the
pedagogy of community and public citizenship-including the
components of mindfulness in advocacy and the theology of hope and
faithful witness discussed in Part I-challenges conventional notions of
lawyer role and function in the adversary system. The next Part
assesses the normative compatibility of the pedagogy of community and
public citizenship with the standard advocacy of adversarial contest
within liberal democratic systems.
186.

Id. at 1493.

187.

Id. at 1495.

188. Id
189. Id. at 1495-96 ("The practitioners invest time and money training the
students, and receive the equivalent of first-year associate work product at a steeply
discounted rate, given that students in the legal rotations model do not receive a salary
for their work.").
190. Id. at 1496 ("Applicants go through a hiring process that includes
submitting credentials to various legal employers, interviewing with prospective
supervisors, and possibly matching with a firm, judge, or other legal practitioner."
(footnote omitted)).
191. Id. at 1496-97.
192.

Id. at 1495, 1498.

193.
194.

Id. at 1498.
Id.
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III. NORMATIVE COMPATIBILITY
Lawyers who come into the courthouse (and law office) from
the community of the faithful do not, finally, depend on the
law to encourage them to do what they can in and with the
Jaw.195
Evaluation of the pedagogy of community and public citizenship in
terms of its compatibility with the conventional notions of lawyer role
and function, and by extension the historical traditions of legal
education and the current organization and economics of the legal
services industry, requires grounding in the jurisprudence of the
lawyering process and the adversary system. Brad Wendel's welldeveloped account of the lawyer role and function provides such a
foundation for the elaboration of a broader jurisprudence of advocacy
and ethics.' 96 Widely known for his work on law and morality in liberal
democratic societies,197 Wendel advances a theory of legal advocacy
and ethics rooted in a "fidelity to law" conception of lawyer
obligation.' 98
A. Fidelity to Law in Advocacy andEthics
The "fidelity to law" conception of advocacy relies on a positivelaw claim of political legitimacy defined by the arrangements-respect
and allegiance-of citizenship.19 For Wendel, political legitimacy
mediates "state power" through "democratic law-making and the rule
of law.""

Mediation safeguards citizens under a politics of law

independent "of ordinary morality and substantive justice."201 On this
195.

SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 53, at 217.

W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010).
197.
See W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics as "PoliticalMoralism" or the
Morality of Politics, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1413 (2008); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal
Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 67 (2005); Alice
Woolley & W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and Moral Character,23 GEO. J. LEGAL
196.

ETHICS 1065 (2010).

198. For a more comprehensive treatment of the "fidelity to law" conception
written earlier this year, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Fidelity to Community: A Defense of
Community Lawyering, 90 TEX. L. REv. 635 (2012) (reviewing WENDEL, supra note
196); see also William H. Simon, AuthoritarianLegal Ethics: Bradley Wendel and the
Positivist Turn, 90 TEX. L. REv. 709 (2012) (reviewing WENDEL, supra note 196).
199. WENDEL, supra note 196, at 2, 7, 11, 47; see also Alfieri, supra note 198,
at 640.
200. WENDEL, supranote 196, at 2; see also Alfieri, supra note 198, at 640.
WENDEL, supra note 196, at 2, 7, 11, 47; see also Alfieri, supra note 198,
201.
at 640.
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analysis, "fidelity to [the] law" is the highest value in advocacy and
ethics.202
To Wendel, law demarcates the force of "raw power" from the
"reason-giving" judgment of legality in public deliberations of rights
and entitlements.203 When "conferred by society" and "political
community," these ordered judgments elevate process over preferences
and desires. 2" Procedural fairness gives "political legitimacy" to such
judgments, he contends, without necessary reference to "ordinary
morality." 205 Legitimacy erodes, however, when outcomes fail to
satisfy widely held, instrumental norms of justice. In such
circumstances, he adds, lawyer-counseled moral dissent and political
protest may ensue in spite of the ethical duty to respect the law.206
Obedience to law in a "democratic political order," Wendel
asserts, fosters civic "peace and stability" through public and private
dispute-resolution procedures. 2' Accessible, settlement-promoting
procedures for cooperative action, he proclaims, reinforce the
legitimacy of positive law systems separate and apart from
considerations of ordinary morality and "substantive justice."208 By
discounting "considerations of morality and justice," Wendel seeks to
insulate good-faith claims of right or "entitlement, political legitimacy,
and procedural legality" from "normative criticism. "209
Wendel's normative defense of legal systems under liberal
democratic regimes extends to a battery of institutions, procedures, and
professional roles. 210 These constituent forms and structures of law and
legal relationships, he argues, encourage a diverse pluralism of interest
and tolerate disagreement over value commitments in politics and
society.211 Pluralism and tolerance embody the coexistence and
202. WENDEL, supra note 196, at 2, 26, 44, 49-50, 67, 71, 87, 89, 122-23,
168, 175, 178, 184, 191, 210; see also Alfieri, supra note 198, at 640.
203. WENDEL, supra note 196, at 2, 3, 119, 202; see also Alfieri, supra note
198, at 640-41.
204. WENDEL, supra note 196, at 2, 6, 14, 61, 123, 130, 160-61, 197, 265;
see also Alfieri, supra note 198, at 641.
205. WENDEL, supra note 196, at 2, 9-10, 29, 56, 62, 120, 210; see also
Alfieri, supra note 198, at 641.
206. WENDEL, supra note 196, at 2-3, 82, 107, 114-16; see also Alfieri, supra
note 198, at 641-42.
207. WENDEL, supra note 196, at 4, 89, 91, 96-98; see also Alfieri, supra note
198, at 642.
208. WENDEL, supra note 196, at 4, 10, 26, 54, 87-89, 99; see also Alfieri,
supra note 198, at 642.
209. WENDEL, supra note 196, at 4, 86, 122, 177; see also Alfieri, supra note
198, at 643.
210. See generallyWENDEL, supra note 196.
211.
Id.
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cooperative fairness of citizenship typical of liberal governance and
lawmaking.212
For Wendel, "abusers of the law" in advocacy and ethics depart
from the norms of democratic governance, fair procedure, and political
legitimacy.' They also split from the Standard Conception of legal
advocacy and ethics manifested in the channeling principles of
partisanship, neutrality, and moral nonaccountability.2 14 Partisanship,
Wendel explains, compels the lawyer to press his client's interests
"within the bounds of the law." 215 Neutrality disassociates the lawyer
from "the morality of the client's cause" and any conduct undertaken in
support of that cause. 216 Nonaccountability permits the lawyer to escape
third-party censure as a defender of law breaking or wrongdoing.2 17
Wendel endorses the instrumental logic of the Standard Conception
and its guiding principles for lawyers engaged to protect the legal
entitlements, rather than the individual interests or preferences, of
clients. 218 In this way, the attorney-client relationship simultaneously
justifies and limits the lawyer's role and power in society. 219 This
notion of role-differentiated morality, and its implied institutional
excuse for professional conduct that deviates from ordinary morality,
narrows Wendel's normative framework for the evaluation of lawyer
roles and practices specifically in case-by-case situations (and
systematically across institutions and fields) .220 That framework
concentrates on the public or political role and function of the lawyer in
maintaining and preserving the institutions of law and society,
particularly judicial and legislative bodies.221

212. WENDEL, supra note 196, at 5-6, 55, 92, 99, 101-02, 115; see also
Alfieri, supra note 198, at 644.
213.
WENDEL, supra note 196, at 5, 86-87; see also Alfieri, supra note 198, at
643.
214. See WENDEL, supra note 196, at 28-30; see also Alfieri, supra note 198,
at 645.
215. WENDEL, supra note 196, at 6, 29; see also Alfieri, supra note 198, at
645.
216. WENDEL, supra note 196, at 6; see also Alfieri, supra note 198, at 645.
217. See WENDEL, supra note 196, at 6, 29-31; see also Alfieri, supra note
198, at 645.
218. See WENDEL, supra note 196, at 6, 31; see also Alfieri, supranote 198, at
645.
219. See WENDEL, supra note 196, at 6-7; see also Alfieri, supra note 198, at
645.
220. Alfieri, supra note 198, at 645-46; see WENDEL, supra note 196, at 7, 20,
23, 27, 122.
221.
See WENDEL, supra note 196, at 7-8, 10, 18, 23, 26, 33-36, 48-49, 64,
84-85, 87, 90-92, 116-17, 131, 156-57; see also Alfieri, supranote 198, at 646-47.
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Wendel attaches moral weight to the public role and function of
lawyers.222 This functional construction both animates and restricts the
lawyer's agency role as an advocate of client legal rights and
entitlements. 2 23 The centrality of rights and entitlements to Wendel's
interpretation of the Standard Conception of legal advocacy and ethics
demands genuine, lawyer good faith in litigation and transactional
representation.
Faith in the legitimacy and seriousness of law shifts Wendel's
analysis from an external evaluative stance of ordinary morality or
injustice to an internal appraisal of infidelity to law.224 Delineated by
Wendel as a jurisprudential breach of faith, infidelity signals a lack of
"respect" not only for the law, but also for the legal system as a
whole .225 That breach, he maintains, diminishes the "social
achievement" of the law in liberal democratic societies, an achievement
that renders the law "worthy" of citizen "loyalty" and lawyer
devotion.226
Wendel links civic loyalty to the law to its social function in
resolving empirical and normative controversy through processes of
"reasoned settlement." 2 27 Settlement processes, he points out, involve
cooperative action steered by a negotiation politics of tolerance, open
debate, equal participation, and mutual respect.228 To command
legitimacy and garner authority, this politics, and its attendant
procedures, must meet basic standards of fairness and respond to
fundamental social needs.229
Systemic fairness and responsiveness, Wendel argues, give law
and the legal system the capacity to mediate cultural and social disputes
in a public domain governed by relative institutional autonomy and
reason.230 However artificial, for Wendel, the reason of law accrues
222.

See WENDEL, supranote 196, at 7; see Alfieri, supra note 198, at 646-47.

223.

See WENDEL, supra note 196, at 8, 52-54, 115-17, 123-55; Alfieri, supra

note 198, at 647-48.
224. Alfieri, supranote 198, at 648; see WENDEL, supra note 196, at 7-8, 115,
123, 128, 167-68.
225. WENDEL, supra note 196, at 9, 123, 132; see Alfieri, supra note 198, at
648.
226. WENDEL, supra note 196, at 9, 158; see also Alfieri, supra note 198, at
648.
227. WENDEL, supra note 196, at 9, 210; see also Alfieri, supra note 198, at
649.
228. See WENDEL, supra note 196, at 9-10, 18-19, 36, 54, 93, 98, 116, 129;
see also Alfieri, supra note 198, at 649.
229. See WENDEL, supra note 196, at 9, 88, 92-96, 98-113; see also Alfieri,
supra note 198, at 649-50.
230. See WENDEL, supra note 196, at 9-10, 96, 112; see also Alfieri, supra
note 198, at 650.

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

144

"moral worth" in terms of social solidarity and cultural respect.23 1 That
accrued worth obviates the need for additional consideration of ordinary
morality or substantive justice. Reason, he contends, instructs lawyer
agents, shapes their institutional roles, and molds their system-wide
practices, thus rendering their conduct morally respectable. 3
To Wendel, the moral respectability and social utility of the lawyer
within liberal democratic institutions contributes to political stability
and the coexistence of interest groups in society.233 Their reason-giving
contribution comes in a professional capacity independent of "ordinary
moral considerations." 234 That independence, Wendel admits, in no way
curbs the freedom of lawyers to oppose "unjust" laws through the wellsettled procedures of litigation and law reform.235 Yet, he cautions, in
challenging unjust laws, lawyers must be careful to avoid "subverting"
the law, its procedures, and its institutions.236 In this respect, the
obligation of fidelity to law restrains lawyers in advocacy, confining
their claims to the legal rights and entitlements of clients. 237 Based on a
commitment to politically prescribed roles and institutionally scripted
functions, such a self-regulating constraint binds lawyers to the internal
norms of law and legality without outside considerations of ordinary
morality or substantive justice .238 This fidelity-to-law imperative clashes
with EBCLC's competing commitment to mindfulness in advocacy and
Shaffer's theology of hope and faithful witness in the overall lawyering
process.

231.

See

WENDEL,

supra note 196, at 10; see also Alfieri, supra note 198, at

650.
232. See WENDEL, supra note 196, at 10, 49-50, 85, 101; Alfieri, supra note
198, at 650.
233. See WENDEL, supra note 196, at 10, 98; Alfieri, supra note 198, at 65051.
234. WENDEL, supra note 196, at 10, 158, 167-68; see also Alfieri, supra note
198, at 651.
235. WENDEL, supra note 196, at 11, 84, 123, 129; see also Alfieri, supra note
198, at 651.
236. WENDEL, supra note 196, at 11, 118, 132; see also Alfieri, supra note
198, at 651.
237. WENDEL, supra note 196, at 11-12; see also Alfieri, supra note 198, at
651 ("Narrowing the space available for the exercise of ordinary moral discretion in
advocacy or counseling, he admits, deprives lawyers of the freedom to serve clients as
'friends or wise counselors.'" (quoting WENDEL, supra note 196, at 11)).
238. See WENDEL, supra note 196, at 11, 34-37; Alfieri, supra note 198, at
652.
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B. Infidelity to Law in Advocacy andEthics
Contrary to Wendel, the pedagogy of community and public
citizenship daily contemplates infidelity to law in ethics and advocacy.
Fundamentally, the pedagogy demands a more normative vision of law
school curricular reform. Moreover, it pleads for a renewed lawyer
responsibility to enlarge economic justice. Further, it seeks to enhance
participation in democratic community. In sum, it urges lawyers and
their clients to collaborate in a wider legal-political enterprise of
democracy promotion specific to underserved, inner-city neighborhoods
segregated by concentrated poverty and differences of class, ethnicity,
and race.
On its face, the "fidelity to law" conception of advocacy seems
supportive, or at least not inconsistent, with the legal-political
enterprise of democracy promotion. In fact, Wendel's positive-law
claim of political legitimacy, bolstered by public respect and allegiance,
affirms the norm of citizenship. His notion that political legitimacy
mediates state power through representative law making and the rule of
law also seems amendable to the legal-political enterprise of upholding
democracy. Here as elsewhere, the mediating force of legitimacy
safeguards citizens under a politics of law, though ordinary morality
and substantive justice may prove integral to that politics. For this
reason, fidelity to the law may fall as the highest value in advocacy and
ethics.
The legal-political enterprise of democracy promotion involves
building and often recovering community through strategies of legal
rights education, organization, and mobilization. Those strategies are
familiar to liberal legalism and interest group pluralism. When
collectively undertaken, they connect lawyers, clients, and communities
in joint partnerships. The practices of mindfulness and spirituality
facilitate lawyer-client and lawyer-community partnerships.
Wendel's view that law demarcates the force of raw power from
the reason-giving judgment of legality in public deliberations of rights
and entitlements may work to favor community partnerships. Rising out
of society and political community, those partnerships also rely on the
ordered judgments of process and procedure over preferences and
desires. For both Wendel and advocates of mindful reconciliation,
procedural fairness gives political legitimacy to such judgments, albeit
not without necessary reference to ordinary morality. On the moral
logic of reconciliation, legitimacy will erode when outcomes fail to
satisfy widely held, instrumental norms of social justice. In such
circumstances, even advocates of reconciliation may counsel moral
dissent and political protest, notwithstanding the ethical duty to respect
the law.
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Although mindfulness and spirituality find common ground in
therapeutic jurisprudence, social psychology, and theology, each
harbors deep links to liberal experimentalism, political organizing, and
rights-based empowerment. Profound moral and emotional forceseach casts an innovative frame for lawyering, policymaking, and lay
advocacy tied to community engagement and personal-professional role
reconciliation. Mindfulness, for example, eschews particular projects or
models of lawyering in favor of a legal-political framework of analysis
for individual action in the context of a group or community-wide
process. Establishing a strong individual-group dynamic among clients
and communities engenders personal, interpersonal, and institutional
change. Equally important, the individual-collective dynamic of mindful
lawyering encourages peacemaking rather than adversarial conflict.
Peacemaking may flow from obedience to law in a democratic
political order. Obedience, as Wendel asserts, may actively foster civic
peace and stability through public and private dispute resolution
procedures. And, furthermore, accessible, settlement-promoting
procedures for cooperative action may actually reinforce the legitimacy
of positive-law systems separate and apart from considerations of
ordinary morality and substantive justice. Yet, discounting
considerations of morality and justice will not insulate good-faith claims
of right or entitlement, political legitimacy, and procedural legality
from normative criticism.
To an important extent, peacemaking allows for greater lawyer
role experimentation in litigation and negotiation consistent with the
personal, political, and cultural circumstances of clients and
communities. Essential to the pedagogy of community and public
citizenship, and to broader democratic participation in inner-city
neighborhoods, peacemaking builds spiritual kinship from the lawyer's
interlocking relationships to the self, to the client, to community
stakeholders, and to social justice movements. Those relationships
permit lawyers to reflect emotionally and intellectually in situations of
partisan conflict. They also enable lawyers to listen and communicate
across boundaries of difference, power, and privilege where behavior
may be misread and perception may be distorted. Difference-induced
misunderstanding may occur in the lawyering process of interviewing,
counseling, and negotiation, or in the political process of group and
neighborhood meditation. In this regard, mindfulness affects the
dynamics of lawyering and political practices in both adversarial
litigation and settlement negotiation.
The interpersonal and intergroup dynamics of lawyering and
political practices are alive in the legal systems Wendel locates under
liberal democratic regimes. The dynamics extend to the institutions,
procedures, and professional roles of lawyering. Because these
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constituent forms and structures of law and legal relationships operate
to encourage a diverse pluralism of interest and tolerate disagreement
over value commritments in politics and society, they crisscross the
boundaries of difference, power, and privilege. Wendel's concepts of
pluralism and tolerance embody the coexistence and cooperative
fairness of citizenship in situations of mindful reconciliation typical of
liberal governance and lawmaking.
The peacemaking locus of mindfulness allows lawyers to shift
between litigation and negotiation models of representation in response
to community needs. The press of needs varies with the levels of
partisan conflict, privilege, and subordination within communities. To
the extent measurable, the accurate assessment of such levels of conflict
and differentiation is crucial to long-term and large-scale strategic
planning for service delivery. Strategic planning of this sort locates the
legal-political work of lawyers in local, national, and international
campaigns for democratic participation and economic justice.
Democratic campaigns depend on the cooperative power of individual
clients, client groups, and client communities.
Dependence on the norms of democratic governance, fair
procedure, and political legitimacy in such campaigns conforms to the
goals of peacemaking. When democratic campaigns depart from the
conventions of political legitimacy or the accepted standards of
advocacy and ethics, however, they do not necessarily condemn
advocates as "abusers of the law." The wide latitude granted by the
Standard Conception of legal advocacy and ethics countenances creative
forms of partisanship. For mindful-reconciliation advocates, that
partisanship comes without the protections afforded by neutrality and
moral nonaccountability. Instead, it is a political-legal partisanship that
may compel the lawyer to press his client's interests beyond the bounds
of the law. From this posture, the lawyer stands inextricably linked to
the morality of his client's cause and any other affiliated conduct
undertaken in support of that cause. Accountability of this sort exposes
the lawyer to potential third-party censure for his defense of law
breaking or wrongdoing.
Cooperative lawyer-client roles and relationships forge alternative
divisions of labor in advocacy and restore abandoned narratives of
citizenship. Such roles and relationships renew lawyer moral
accountability and political participation without conferring movement
leadership. Citizenship narratives highlight the competence,
independence, self-sufficiency, and solidarity of community-centered
individuals and groups. While acknowledging economic vulnerability,
the narratives help organize and mobilize neighborhood improvement
and self-help campaigns by appealing to the productive capabilities of
poor communities manifested in the work of churches, nonprofits, and
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small businesses. Harnessing those capabilities redefines and
reorganizes the labor of advocacy independent of lawyer leadership and
in deference to client legal-political judgment. An expression of
personal and social power, client legal-political judgment draws
strength from spirituality.
Spirituality may blunt the instrumental logic of the Standard
Conception. Under its guiding principles, Wendel suggests, lawyers
engaged to protect the legal entitlements, rather than the individual
interests or preferences, of clients function within the constraints of the
attorney-client relationship.23 9 That relationship, he points out,
simultaneously justifies and limits the lawyer's role and power in
society." Further, spirituality may stymie the notion of roledifferentiated morality and its associated institutional excuse for
professional conduct that deviates from ordinary morality. Unlike the
Standard Conception, mindfulness and spirituality expand Wendel's
normative framework for the evaluation of lawyer roles and practices in
case-by-case situations and in institutional settings. Together
mindfulness and spirituality enlarge the public and political role and
function of the lawyer in maintaining and reforming the institutions of
law and society, whether judicial or legislative bodies.
At bottom, spirituality acts as a summons to reconciliation. Like
the peacemaking of mindfulness, the practice of reconciliation turns
away from the adversary tradition of lawyer-client instrumentalism and
the corresponding imagery of battle. Reconciliation, however, posits a
broader model of peacemaking among individuals and groups allied
with the person of the client and the persons who hear advocacy in
order to inculcate a sense of the neglected in community. In this sense,
reconciliation offers a moral discourse and a moral witness to injustice
predicated on an appeal to goodness and interpersonal harmony.
The public role and function of lawyers practicing an advocacy of
reconciliation carries moral weight. That moral underpinning broadens
Wendel's functional construction of the lawyer's agency role as an
advocate of client legal rights and entitlements. It also confirms the
moral import of genuine, lawyer good faith in litigation and
transactional representation under Wendel's interpretation of the
Standard Conception and the moral burden of legal advocacy and ethics
in defense of client rights and entitlements. His faith in the legitimacy
and seriousness of law errantly shifts the relevant analysis away from
external evaluative measures of ordinary morality or injustice to
internal appraisals of infidelity to law. By shifting to internal
benchmarks, and denouncing such infidelities as a jurisprudential
239.
240.
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breach of faith signifying a lack of "respect" not only for the law, but
also for the legal system as a whole, Wendel unnecessarily diminishes
the "social achievement" of the law in liberal democratic societies and
discounts its social worth to citizens.241
Significantly, advocacy reconciliation directs the appeal of
goodness to the powerful and the powerless. The crux of that appeal is
to conscience, not to authority or power. The subject of the appeal is
the decision maker. The object is his conversion to goodness. Plainly,
the conversion to goodness attaches moral content. Advocates of
conversion through the moral force of reconciliation seek to bind both
clients and decision makers together in a compassionate community of
peace apart from groups and the state. Often prophetic, the advocates
embrace caring, faith, and conscience over simple loyalty. When
practiced in common, these virtues encourage a moral discourse and a
sense of social justice clasped to interpersonal advocacy relationships
among lawyers, clients, and decision makers.
Both moral discourse and social justice build civic loyalty. When
law, in its social function, resolves empirical and normative
controversy through processes of "reasoned settlement," civic loyalty
increases. As Wendel observes, settlement processes augment loyalty
through cooperative action guided by a negotiation politics of tolerance,
open debate, equal participation, and mutual respect.242 He points to the
legitimacy and authority of a politics of negotiation, and its procedures,
insofar as they meet shared standards of fairness and respond to critical
social needs. 243 Additionally, he notes that the systemic fairness and the
responsiveness that mindful reconciliation advocates here seek in law
and the legal system is made possible by the capacity of positive law to
mediate cultural and social disputes in a public domain. 2" Both Wendel
and reconciliation advocates see that domain governed by relative
institutional autonomy and reason. Reconciliation advocates do not
gainsay that the reason of law accrues "moral worth" in terms of social
solidarity and cultural respect. Rather, they invoke the need for
additional consideration of ordinary morality or substantive justice to
supplement legal reasoning.245 Absent moral direction, the institutional
roles and system-wide practices of lawyers risk illegitimacy.
Because they engage in moral discourse, advocates of
reconciliation begin with an examination of personal conscience and
professional community, particularly the codes and rules regulating
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See id. at 6.
Id. at 4, 24, 98.
Id. at 81.
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community. Next they assess the person of the client as he or she is
situated in community. For advocates of prophetic reconciliation, a
community is inevitably sinful and tragic in excluding citizens from
both inside and outside its borders. Nonetheless, prophetic advocates
hope that in acting together they may be able to rescue the tragic
victims of exclusion. Paradoxically, acts of rescue in advocacy
undermine the integrity of the community norms and values employed
to justify exclusion from within and without, that is the very community
norms and values that produced the tragedy of exclusion. Confronted
by tragedy, prophetic advocates express hope in acts of faithful witness
and defiance. Faithful witness to tragedy in law and community
expresses the limits of worldly power. Defiance against the tragedy of
exclusion conveys opposition to the incursions of worldly power.
Wendel's argument for the moral respectability and social utility of
the lawyer within liberal democratic institutions omits hopeful acts of
faithful witness and defiance. It is unlikely that such acts contribute to
political stability and to the coexistence of interest groups in society. In
contrast to the reason-giving contribution of legal advocacy that comes
independent of ordinary moral considerations, the contribution of
prophetic advocates comes in the form of opposition to "unjust" laws.
To Wendel, prophetic advocates are incautious in their legal-political
advocacy, challenging unjust laws in ways that threaten to subvert the
law itself.2" His obligation of fidelity to law restrains such reckless
advocacy but sacrifices acts of faithful witness and defiance in support
of client claims to legal rights and entitlements. The commitment to
politically prescribed roles and institutionally scripted functions,
coupled with the self-regulating limitation imposed by the internal
norms of law and legality, leave prophetic advocates of reconciliation
without recourse to ordinary morality and substantive justice in their
defense of community. The next Part explores the functional
compatibility of the pedagogy of community and public citizenship with
the curricular form and content of contemporary legal education.
IV. FUNCTIONAL COMPATIBILITY
Inquiry into the functional compatibility of the pedagogy of
community and public citizenship with the curricular form and content
of contemporary legal education comes amid a longstanding and now
widening call for institutional reform.247 The summons to reform
246. See id. at 26, 150.
247. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinhing Legal Education, 43 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 595 (2008); Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J.
1303, 1303-06 (1947).
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addresses professional skills 248 and values 249 and integrates the study of
other professional disciplines. 210 It also encompasses the assessment25 '

of emotional intelligence, 252 problem solving, 253 and pro bono
commitment. 254
The recent curricular study put forward by Coursin incorporates
the essential skills of practice and professionalism into a multilevel
framework for hands-on experiential education. The framework
assimilates medical school pedagogy in an effort to adopt a legal
rotation model of professional training. The model contemplates a
progression through first-year doctrinal instruction, second-year clinical
and simulation-based coursework, and a concluding third-year
residency. This sequential rotation model, coupled with the adoption of
outcome-based assessment measures, offers a promising medium for the
teaching of community and public citizenship. Turn once more to the
curricular form of that evolving pedagogy.

248. See generally Russell Engler, The MacCrate Report Turns 10: Assessing
Its Impact and Identifying Gaps We Should Seek to Narrow, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 109,
110-11 (2001); Russell G. Pearce, MacCrate's Missed Opportmity: The MacCrate

Report's Failureto Advance Professional Values, 23 PACE L. REV. 575 (2003).
249.

See generally Charlotte S.

Alexander,

Learning to Be Lawyers:

ProfessionalIdentity and the Law School Curriculum, 70 MD. L. REV. 465 (2011); Neil
Hamilton & Verna Monson, The Positive EmpiricalRelationship of Professionalismto
Effectiveness in the Practiceof Law, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 137 (2011).
250. See generally Beryl Blaustone, Improving Clinical Judgment in Lawyering
with MultidisciplinaryKnowledge about Brain Function and Human Behavior: What
Should Law Students Learn about Human Behavior for Effective Lawyering? 40 U.
BALT. L. REV. 607 (2011); David Stern, Outside the Classroom: Teaching and
EvaluatingFuture Physicians,20 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 877 (2004).
251. See generally Rogelio A. Lasso, Is Our Students Learning? Using
Assessments to Measure and Improve Law School Learning and Performance, 15
BARRY L. REV. 73 (2010); Katherine Mangan, Law Schools Resist Proposal to Assess
Them Based on What Students Learn, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 10, 2010),
http://chronicle.com/article/Law-Schools-Resist-Proposal/63494/.

252. See generally Kristin B. Gerdy, Clients, Empathy, and Compassion:
Introducing First-Year Students to the "Heart" of Lawyering, 87 NEB. L. REV. 1
(2008).
253.

See generally Beryl Blaustone & Carmen Huertas-Noble, Lawyering at the

Intersection of Mediation and Community Economic Development: Interweaving
Inclusive Legal Problem Solving Skills in the Trainingof Effective Lawyers, 34 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL Y 157 (2010); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, "Lawyer as Problem Solver:"
CurricularInnovation at Dayton, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 547 (2007).
254. See generally Rebecca Sandefur & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Effect, 16
CLINICAL L. REV. 57 (2009).
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A. CurricularForm

The pedagogy of community and public citizenship is adaptable to
multiple curricular forms and contexts. It may be intertwined with
doctrinal, empirical, and interdisciplinary forms of study. Likewise, it
may be deployed across classroom, clinical, and external field
placement contexts. Coursin's outcome-based, rotation model of legal
education presents a particularly promising vehicle for institution-wide,
curricular reform tailored to the traditions of legal education and the
needs of the legal services industry. Part of that promise involves the
capacity to rediscover and renew the normative underpinnings of
practice and professional traditions. Part also entails the willingness to
reconsider and redefine the nature of industry economic needs,
particularly insofar as they shape notions of lawyer role and function,
conceptions of adversarial justice, and visions of legal-political
community.
Responsive to current marketplace trends in both education and
industry, the model focuses on preparing students to serve clients
usefully as new practitioners from the outset of their professional
careers. Preparation of this kind requires experiential learning and
practical skill development in classroom and clinical settings. In
addition to the standard battery of lawyering process skills (e.g.,
interviewing, counseling, fact investigation, and negotiation), as well as
legal research and writing, skill development includes critical thinking,
problem solving, interpersonal communication, and professionalism,
especially ethical judgment and civic engagement, two of the foundation
stones for community and public citizenship.
Coursin derives his outcome-based, rotation model of practical
skills-training from the experiential learning methodologies of medical
education employed in classrooms, laboratories, and clinical
environments. The methodologies combine training and assessment into
a continuing process of skill mastery and professional development.
That learning process applies to both ethical judgment and civic
engagement. Borrowing from and expanding upon these methodologies,
Coursin installs not only common case-dialogue methods and classroom
and clinical rotations, but also advanced, residency-like
apprenticeships.
Under this hybrid apprenticeship model, medical and law students
acquire basic professional knowledge as well as essential practiceoriented skill training. Central to apprenticeship-based knowledge, skill
acquisition, and clinical practice performance, is a comprehensive
mentoring system composed of faculty members, upper-level students,
and field-placement supervising attorneys. This three-tiered mentoring
system operates in classrooms and in field placements. Each context
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entails performance evaluation and longitudinal feedback to gauge
professional development and assess learning outcomes. The resulting
skill-related dialogue, occurring throughout the semester or summer
session, reinforces student learning goals and the continuity of student
service commitment. Standing alone, however, neither mentoring
feedback nor skill-related dialogue will overcome the self-regarding
weight of practice tradition and the profit-maximizing economics of
industry need.
Similarly, clinical and simulation-based pathways afford students
valuable opportunities for intensive skill development and mentoring
relationships within a network of bar and bench practicing partners, a
network deeply influenced by self-regarding traditions and profitmaximizing imperatives. This professional network expands under
Coursin's apprenticeship model to include residency and two-semester
advanced rotations that foster maturity and professionalism. The
pedagogy of community and public citizenship gives alternative
meaning to professionalism drawn from the notion of mindfulness in
advocacy and the theology of hope and faithful witness. Turn again to
the curricular content of the pedagogy of community and public
citizenship.
B. CurricularContent

The pedagogy of community and public citizenship is predicated
on client and community diversity. 255 Relevant to both client256 and
student identity, 257 diversity norms guide the development of crosscultural competence 258 across languages 259 and geographic
255. See Michelle J. Anderson, Legal Education Reform, Diversity, and
Access to Justice, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 1011, 1016-19 (2009); Liwen Mah, The Legal
Profession Faces New Faces: How Lawyers' Professional Norms Should Change to
Serve a ChangingAmerican Population, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1721, 1721-24 (2005).
256. See generally Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of
Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in
Lawyeing Courses, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1807 (1993); Anthony V. Alfieri,
Color/Identity/Justice:Chicano Tials, 53 DuKE L.J. 1569 (2004) (book review).
257. See generally Chris K. lijima, Separating Support from Betrayal:
Examining the Intersections of Racialized Legal Pedagogy, Academic Support, and
Subordination, 33 IND. L. REV. 737 (2000); Antoinette Sedillo L6pez, Making and
Breaking Habits: Teaching (and Learning) Cultural Context, Self-A wareness, and
Intercultural Communication through Case Supervision in a Client-Service Legal
Clinic, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 37 (2008).
258. See Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-CulturalCompetence
in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33 (2001); Beverly I. Moran, DisappeaingAct: The
Lack of Values Training in Legal Education-A Case for Cultural Competency, 38
S.U. L. REV. 1 (2010); Ascanio Piomelli, Cross-CulturalLawyering by the Book: The
Latest Clinical Texts and a Sketch of a FutureAgenda, 4 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY
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communities."* The norms underline the need for inclusion26 1 in
pursuing a social justice mission.262 That mission includes the practice
of poverty and public interest law.263 The goal is to elevate this ongoing
practice through experiential learning" in order to expand access to
justice,26 refine skills training,26 and formulate useful service protocols
and metrics to track outcomes.267
Instilling the values of community and public citizenship in law
students through classroom and clinical pedagogy requires by turns
L.J. 131 (2006); see also Deleso Alford Washington, CriticalRace Feminist Bioethics.:
Telling Stories in Law School and Medical School in Pursuit of "Cultural
Competency", 72 ALB. L. REV. 961 (2009).
259. See generally Muneer I.Ahmad, Interpreting Communities: Lawyering
acrossLanguage Difference, 54 UCLA L. REV. 999 (2007).

260. See generally Juliet M. Brodie, Little Cases on the Middle Ground:
Teaching Social Justice Lawyering in Neighborhood-Based Community Lawyering
Clinics, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 333 (2009); Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the] Road Back In:
Community Lawyering in Indigenous Communities, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 557 (1999);
Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood, 32
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67 (2000); Andrea M. Seielstad, Community Building as a

Means of Teaching Creative, Cooperative, and Complex Problem Solving in Clinical
Legal Education, 8 CLINICAL. L. REV. 445 (2002); Karen Tokarz, Nancy L. Cook,
Susan Brooks & Brenda Bratton Blom, Conversations on "Community Lawyering":
The Newest (Oldest) Wave in ClinicalLegal Education, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 359
(2008).
See Peggy Cooper Davis, DesegregatingLegal Education, 26 GA. ST. U.
261.
L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2010); Nancy E. Dowd, Diversity Matters: Race, Gender, and
Ethncity in Legal Education, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POt'Y 11, 12-17 (2003);

Margaret M. Russell, McLaunn's Seat: The Need for Racial Inclusion in Legal
Education, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1825 (2002).

262. See generally Lauren Carasik, Justice in the Balance: An Evaluation of
One Clinic's Ability to Harmonize Teaching Practical Skills, Ethics, and
Professionalism with a Social Justice Mission, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc. JUST. 23
(2006); Shin Imai, A Counter-Pedagogyfor Social Justice: Core Skills for CommunityBased La wyering, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 195 (2002).

263. See Juliet M. Brodie, Post-Welfare Lawyering Clhical Legal Education
and a New Poverty Law Agenda, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 201 (2006); Louise G.
Trubek, Crossing Boundaries: Legal Education and the Challenge of the "New Public
Interest Law", 2005 Wis. L. REv. 455.

264.

See generally Deborah Maranville, Infusing Passion and Context into the

Traditional Law Curriculum through Experiential Learning, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 51
(2001).

265. See generally Stephen Wizner & Jane Aiken, Teaching and Doing: The
Role of Law School Clinics in Enhancing Access to Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 997
(2004).
266.
(2001).
267.

See Stephen Wizner, Beyond Skills Training, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 327
See generally Roy STUCKEY

ET AL.,

BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL

EDUCATION (2007); Roy Stuckey, Teaching with Purpose: Defining and Achieving
Desired Outcomes in ClinicalLaw Courses, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 807 (2007).
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fidelity and infidelity to law. Applicable to advocacy and ethics, both
conceptions offer a normative vision of law school curricular reform.
They also carve out space for lawyer responsibility to advance
economic justice. And they confirm the importance of, and the value of
participation in, democratic citizenship. Together, in these general
ways, they allow lawyers and clients collaborative room to maneuver in
local, national, and international democracy-promoting campaigns
targeting underserved, inner-city neighborhoods.
The support of the "fidelity to law" conception of advocacy for
legal-political democracy campaigns lies in the public respect and
allegiance norms of citizenship. Embedded in the political legitimacy of
representative democracy and the rule of law, the norms betray
ordinary morality and substantive justice in aiding impoverished
communities through legal rights education, organization, and
mobilization. Nothing in the tenets of liberal legalism or interest group
pluralism requires this betrayal of morality- or justice-based community
partnerships.
The practices of mindfulness and spirituality seek to rescue lawyerclient and lawyer-community partnerships. Those partnerships emerge
despite the raw power of privilege. Moreover, they sometimes benefit
from the reason-giving judgments of legality in public deliberations of
rights and entitlements. Too often, however, the ordered judgments of
process and procedure fail community partnerships. Legal process
grants those judgments political legitimacy even when they contravene
ordinary morality and social justice.
The "fidelity to law" conception gives advocates the discretion to
express moral dissent and political protest toward wrongful processbased judgments. Protest may include individual, group, or communitywide action. Yet, that conception fails to link protest to the
development of an individual-group dynamic among clients and
communities to foster personal, interpersonal, and institutional
peacemaking.
Peacemaking and the obedience at the core of the "fidelity to law"
conception may operate concurrently, for example when public and
private dispute resolution procedures offer accessible, settlementpromoting opportunities for cooperative action. Severed from
considerations of ordinary morality and substantive justice, however,
simple obedience will do little to build spiritual kinship between
lawyers, clients, community stakeholders, and social justice
movements. Admittedly, obedience may permit emotional and
intellectual reflection by lawyers. And it may permit lawyer-client
communication across difference, power, and privilege. But the
interpersonal and intergroup dynamics of lawyering under liberal
democratic regimes require more than obedience to law. Liberal
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democratic systems demand a diverse pluralism of interest and a deep
tolerance of disagreement over value commitments in politics and
society. Obedience neither encourages nor preserves these primary
citizenship values.
Mindful advocacy treats obedience as one of many factors relevant
to long-term and large-scale strategic planning in the delivery of legal
services and in the politics of democratic participation. Local
participatory democracy hinges on cooperative power not obedience to
power, legal or otherwise. To be sure, norms of democratic governance
and fair procedure command a degree of obedience to safeguard the
political legitimacy of peacemaking. Under the Standard Conception of
advocacy and ethics, failure to render such obedience does not
constitute an abuse of law. Instead, it signals legal-political
partisanship, partially restrained by the bounds of law and justice, for
which advocates must morally account. In this way, the lawyer
embraces the morality of, and accountability for, his client's cause.
The accountability of lawyer-client roles and relationships also
extends to the narratives of citizenship. The citizenship narratives of
community competence, independence, self-sufficiency, and solidarity
spur neighborhood organization and mobilization. Entrenched in the
productive capabilities of poor communities, the narratives renew the
spirituality of lawyer roles, relationships, and practices by focusing
advocacy on peacemaking. The reconciliation of peacemaking stems
from the defense of the neglected in a community.
A form of moral witness, reconciliation appeals to goodness and
interpersonal harmony in litigation and in negotiation. That appeal
springs from a good faith belief in ordinary morality and the social
worth of citizenship. In effect, it is an appeal to the conscience of the
powerful, commonly a decision maker in law and politics. The appeal
seeks the conversion of the decision maker to goodness and his entry
into a compassionate community of peace. Mindful reconciliation
encourages conversion and compassionate community as a means to
comply with ordinary morality and to achieve substantive justice.
Advocates of reconciliation balance the dictates of personal
conscience and professional community in dealing with the tragedy of
client exclusion from his own community. When community norms
justify exclusion, mindful advocates are left to exercise limited acts of
faithful witness and defiance. Coursin's hybrid apprenticeship model of
curricular reform offers scant sense of how to teach hopeful acts of
faithful witness and defiance. Although unlikely to contribute to
political order and stability in a liberal democratic society, the acts
present a reason-giving form of advocacy and ethics tied to ordinary
moral considerations of tragedy. In communities that neglect and
exclude the powerless among them, those considerations give rise to
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opposition against "unjust" laws. To Wendel and others, that
opposition may threaten to subvert the law. To Coursin, the pedagogy
of community and public citizenship depends on the willingness of
advocates to teach the law, politics, and ethics of reconciliation and
subversion in defense of community.
CONCLUSION

Prophetic ideals of leadership,2 6 8 whether adopted by lawyer-first
responders2 69 or lawyer-social engineers,270 envision faith-based lawyer,
client, and community collaborations motivated by individual and
institutional moral obligations.271 The obligations may borrow their
substance from spirituality and theology,272 or the norms of liberal
democratic systems .273 This Essay searches out such obligations in law
and legal institutions in order to better educate lawyers for community.
My own community of twenty-five years, a community of lawyers,
clients, judges, scholars, and more recently church congregations, no
longer provides the form or substance of obligations suitable for wide
ranging advocacy across a diverse demographic landscape of identity,
geography, and space. The experience of community simply may be too

268. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyers as Prophets, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
469 (2003); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Biblical Prophets as Lawyers for the Poor, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 15 (2003); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 207-13 (2000); Deborah L. Rhode,
Lawyers as Leaders, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 413; Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers and
Leadership, 20 PROF. LAw., no. 3, 2010, at 1.
269. See, e.g., Melissa Gibson Swain & JoNel Newman, Helping Haiti in the
Wake of Disaster:Law Students as First Responders, 6 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 133 (2011).
270. See, e.g., Kemit A. Mawakana, HistoricallyBlack College and University
Law Schools: GeneratingMultitudes of Effective Social Engineers, 14 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 679 (2011).
271.
See generally Ysmael D. Fonseca, The Catholic Church's Obligation to
Serve the Stranger in Defiance of State Inurngration Laws, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 291 (2009); Kara L. Wild, The New Sanctuary Movement:
When Moral Mission Means Breaking the Law, and the Consequences for Churches
and Illegal lnmigrants,50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 981 (2010).
272. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Moral Theology of Atticus Finch, 42 U.
PITT. L. REV. 181 (1981); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Rehgious Legal Ethics, 35 CATH.
LAW. 393 (1994); Thomas Shaffer, The Profession as a Moral Teacher, 18 ST. MARY S
L.J. 195 (1986); Thomas L. Shaffer, A Search for Balance in the Whirlwind of Law
School; Spiritualityfrom Law Teachers, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1191 (2007).
273. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Democratic Virtues, Our Common Life and
the Common School: Trust in Democracy: Anabaptists, Italian Americans, and
Solidarity, 21 J.L. & RELIGION 413 (2005-06); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of
Belonging, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 703 (1988).
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complex and multifaceted for a single set of moral, legal, or political
obligations.
Whatever the source of the obligation, to meet and to teach the
higher calling of mindfulness and spirituality, its professional
performance in litigation and in negotiation must express "the affection
citizens have for each other." 274 Part of that affection arises between the
lawyer and client when engaged in the practice of community. In that
practice, as Tom Shaffer reminds us, you have to go together in
pursuit of public citizenship and social justice.275 Echoed thinly in
ABA and state ethics rules, that special civic responsibility warrants the
development of an explicit pedagogy of community and public
citizenship in legal education and professional training, a pedagogy that
may evolve from Coursin's hybrid apprenticeship model of experiential
learning.
This Essay, an emerging part of an ongoing classroom study and
clinical service project, seeks to continue that development, building on
a half century of scholarship from diverse fields. Aimed at law students
and lawyers, the Essay integrates considerations of ethics, education
and psychology, law and religion, and the lawyering process. Starting
from legal and theological materials on mindfulness and spirituality, it
attempts to situate the pedagogy of community and public citizenship in
an outcome-based, rotation curricular model of legal education, to
appraise that pedagogy against conventional notions of lawyer role and
function in the adversary system, and to evaluate its compatibility with
the curricular form and content of contemporary legal education. From
these efforts the only true point of clarity that arises here relates to the
role of affection in law, community, and public citizenship. To be
realized in law and lawyering, that affection, the late Professor Milner
Ball explains, must show neither "desire of injury or revenge" nor
"asperity or hatred."276 In searching for traces of affection in law and
lawyering, for Ball and for us the question remains: "how does it come
about that citizens can love each other?" 277

274. D. Robert Lohn & Milner S. Ball, Legal Advocacy, Performance, and
Affection, 16 GA. L. REV. 853, 860 (1982).
275. See SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 217.
276. Lohn & Ball, supra note 274, at 860.
277. Id.

